

UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL
USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Unauthorized Disclosures

FROM:

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

DATE

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

RECEIVED FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

10 DEC 1973

(2)


2.

3. C/PRG/IC Staff

Attn: 

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

(2) 
 SINCE STYLE IS A
 HIGHLY PERSONAL THING
 THIS COULD BE WRITTEN
 DIFFERENTLY SO IF YOU
 FEEL IT SHOULD BE
 EDITED - FEEL FREE.
 YOU KNOW BETTER HOW
 IT WOULD BE RECEIVED
 BY THE BOARD. I DO
 THINK THAT THE SURFACE
 IS WELL COVERED.



~~SECRET~~

DD/Mar 12-1730

10 DEC 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Product Review Group,
Intelligence Community Staff

25X1 ATTENTION :

THROUGH : Acting Deputy Director for
Management and Services

SUBJECT : Unauthorized Disclosures

1. Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Members of the United States Intelligence Board prepared by the Office of Security in response to the Director's request on 5 December 1973.

2. The memorandum contains some of the Director's recent remarks which seem particularly appropriate. The thrust of the content is toward the individual's personal commitment for protection of intelligence. It is unclassified and may be given wide dissemination.

3. If the memorandum meets with your approval, it is requested that you forward it to General Graham and the Director.

25X1

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

E.O. 14176 IMPDET CL BY 006063

SECRET

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

25X1

- 1 -
- 1 - IC Registry
- 2 - DD/M&S

SECRET

Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Principals
SUBJECT : Unauthorized Disclosures

1. As Director of Central Intelligence I am committed to conduct our foreign intelligence activities in conformity with the laws, the standards and the customs of the United States. This includes an orderly review, declassification and appropriate release of intelligence materials. As Director I am also charged with the protection of intelligence sources and methods and I am concerned about the recent spate of articles in the press which jeopardize them.

2. Some stories may have resulted from a simple compilation of bits and pieces of intelligence inadvertently disclosed. But some have revealed depth and detail which could only come from those with authorized access to classified intelligence. Such deliberate leaks about our foreign intelligence sources and methods for personal or institutional gain are invariably short-sighted. In the long view they can and do:

- (a) Threaten the safety and welfare of dedicated and loyal officers.
- (b) Reduce or curtail our sources.
- (c) Provide foreign services with gratuitous insight into our capabilities and limitations.
- (d) Reduce or eliminate the confidential nature of intelligence with a corresponding reduction of its value to the government.
- (e) Waste our tax dollars.

3. A number of actions have been taken to close this gap in the security of the intelligence community. Personal representation by previous Directors backed by strong expressions of Presidential concern have been made. You have established security guides which, if scrupulously followed, would reduce the number of inadvertent disclosures and limit the damage of deliberate leaks. The actions have had some success. But in the final analysis I believe the solution to the leak problem rests with the individual at all levels who has authorized access to classified materials.

4. The responsibility for protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods requires a personal commitment. It requires the individual to take upon himself the responsibility to ensure the integrity of the privileged information with which he is entrusted. It requires that the individual accept the general and fundamental concept that one individual cannot assume responsibility for deciding that he alone knows best what should and what should not be revealed. It requires use of established procedures by each individual when release of intelligence seems indicated for whatever reason.

5. I ask the Members of the Board to make my views on this matter known to all individuals with access to our intelligence materials. I request that you make available to them your guidelines and procedures to be followed on the release of intelligence and encourage full participation in them.

6. I believe that if we have the individual's personal commitment to protect intelligence and to comply with established guidelines for its release we need not fear for our intelligence sources and methods.

W. E. Colby
Director